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Abstract: Romania was the only example of violent regime change in the central and south 
eastern European milieu, with massive mobilizations both in favour and against change and 
the execution of the dictator. In other words,  there seems to have been an attempted coup 
d’état in Romania, one that was successful thanks to the unplanned escalation of violence 
organized  from below without  any links  to  the  intra-elite  disputes.  This  process  started 
locally in a community linked with the outside world able to draw on supportive networks. 
Contention quickly scaled up to the capital city and produced a vacuum of power as a result 
of the anti-Ceaușescu communists’ decision to immediately topple and execute the dictator. 
This opened the way to a chaotic moment of violence that was not organized by supporters 
or opponents of the regime, but rather produced by the vacuum of power in a collapsed 
sultanistic totalitarian regime. The lack of international support for democratization, weak 
local civil society and unorganized violence allowed the neo-communists to settle in power. 
However, a revolution was already ongoing, notwithstanding the neo-communist elites’ wish 
to merely modify the previous regime. This led to the emergence of a democratic setting.
Keywords:  democratization,  religious  movement,  political  violence,  coup  d’état,  post-
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Introduction
Romania was the only example of violent  regime change in the central  and 
south eastern European milieu, with massive mobilizations both in favour and 
against change and the execution of the dictator. Two main interpretations of the 
process of regime change in Romania are in circulation.  First,  one group of 
authors  define  it  as  an  elite  coup  by  anti-Nicolae  Ceaușescu  sectors  of  the 
Romanian Communist Party (Chilton, 1994; Haerpfer, 2009; Roper, 2000) or a 
coup accompanied by a popular uprising (Verdery and Kligman, 1992). Second, 
others  speak  of  a  revolution  (Hall,  1999;  Siani-Davies,  2005).  In  this  last 
perspective, the best documented research is reported in Siani-Davies’ book, in 
which the author argues that because the events were determined by massive 
mobilization and the narratives were built on the myth of a liberation revolution, 
the events are better defined as such.
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Periodization
The event that initiated the democratization process was the jailing of pastor 
Lázló Tőkés in Timișoara, the main city of the Transylvania region (populated 
by the Hungarian ethnic minority) on December 15th 1989. Tőkés was a pastor 
who organized the local community in anti-regime activities without the support 
of the authorities of the Hungarian Reformed Church (Deletant,  2006; Siani-
Davies,  2005:  ch.  2).  Events  unfolded  quickly  following  his  imprisonment. 
Transition,  according to Siani-Davies (2005),  followed two phases.  The first 
phase  was  concentrated  in  Timișoara  until  a  diffusion  process  began  on 
December 15th, lasting until the 22nd (from the first protests in Timișoara to the 
execution of Ceaușescu). The second phase lasted from that point until February 
9th 1990,  moving  from  the  vacuum  of  power  to  the  constitution  of  the 
Provisional Council of National Unity. This second stage was characterized by 
violent clashes in the capital between security forces, rumours of terrorists from 
the  Middle  East  attacking  regime change  and  the  consolidation  of  the  anti-
Ceaușescu communist elite in power.
First phase: localized contention
The  first  phase  was  linked  to  the  mobilization  of  the  local  community  of 
Timișoara in support of Tőkés. These events began with a massive gathering in 
front of Tőkés’ house in order to prevent the authorities from taking him to jail. 
Initially  there was no repression,  but  after  three days of  local  protests,  riots 
spread across the city in the night between the 17 th and the 18th of December 
1989 and the military killed several protestors.  On December 18 th Timișoara 
workers protested against the repression, initiating a de facto strike. The local 
authorities’ response  was  to  stop  repression,  which  produced  an  increase  in 
protest and the closure of all factories in Timișoara on 19 th and 20th December 
(Siani-Davies, 2005: ch. 2). From December 20th on, a process of diffusion of 
protest  to  other  towns  in  Transylvania  started  with  Cluj  and  Sibiu,  and 
eventually reaching Bucharest.  However, protests were irrelevant in all cities 
outside the capital.
Second phase: contention in Bucharest
From the 20th to the 22nd December massive protests and riots spread across the 
city centre of Bucharest. The protests were not organized by any political actor, 
and were mostly characterized by an escalation in violence. On December 20th, 
Nicolae Ceaușescu returned from a visit to Iran and delivered a televised speech 
against the Timișoara demonstrations.  Ceaușescu’s discourse was directed at 
the  population  and elites  of  Timișoara,  accused of  disregarding his  order  to 
repress protestors.
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On December 21st, Ceaușescu organized a televised pro-government rally 
that  generated anti-regime protests  by some participants,  causing the official 
television  station  to  stop  broadcasting.  That  same  day,  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior committed suicide, but was thought to have been killed by forces loyal 
to Ceaușescu because he had refused to repress protestors (Siani-Davies, 2005). 
During the day there was an increase in violent contention in Bucharest, with 
riots, lootings, cross-shootings, tank attacks and thousands of killings.
The turning point of the process was on December 22nd, when the regime 
broke down and a vacuum of power was produced as a result. A second attempt 
by  Ceaușescu  to  give  a  speech  in  Bucharest,  this  time  from  the  RCP 
headquarters, failed as the dictator was stopped by people throwing shoes and 
potatoes at him. On that same day military troops refrained from repression and 
the people entered the RCP headquarters. Ceaușescu and his wife escaped by 
helicopter from the roof of the RCP building, producing the virtual end of the 
regime.
After  just  one day of  the power vacuum the National  Salvation Front 
(NSF) was created. The NSF was an anti-Ceaușescu coalition of RCP elites, 
with Ion Iliescu, an anti-Stalinist RCP leader, as its main figure. On the same 
day,  Nicolae  and  Elena  Ceaușescu  were  captured  in  Tirgoviste.  The  NSF 
subjected them to a two-hour fake trial where they were declared guilty. They 
were executed on December 24th.
Meanwhile, from the 23rd to the 25th of December, the Securitate (secret 
police)  entered  into  open  and  violent  confrontation  with  the  military,  the 
demonstrating  masses  and  the  anti-government  troops.  No  security  force 
remained loyal to Ceaușescu. However, they may have profited from the chaotic 
situation  to  control  specific  state  areas  and resources  during the transitional 
period. The cause of the violence was a rumour spread by the NSF about Middle 
Eastern  terrorists  entering  Romania  to  promote  chaos  and  profit  from  the 
vacuum of power created by the sudden demise of Ceaușescu and the chaotic 
attempts by uncoordinated security forces to stop violence in the streets (Siani-
Davies, 2005: ch. 3; Verdery and Kligman, 1992: 121-122). Violence ended on 
December 25th, though some isolated events continued until January 4th 1990.
After  the end of violence the NSF attempted to consolidate itself as the 
new government. After some initial hesitation it called elections, participating as 
a  party.  However,  on  January  28th and  29th 1990  smaller  and  non-violent 
mobilizations were organized by anti-NSF forces (traditional pre-communism 
parties  and  the  student  movement)  against  the  NSF’s  participation  in  the 
elections. These protests were completely ineffective as the NSF did not change 
its position (Siani-Davies, 2005: ch. 5).
The  end  point  of  the  revolutionary  process  according  to  Siani-Davies 
(2005) was February 9th 1990, when the NSF founded the Provisional Council 
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of  National  Unity  with  all  anti-Ceaușescu  political  sectors  to  govern  in  the 
transitional  period  until  elections.  However,  a  few  additional  protests  were 
organized by (small  amounts  of)  students  on  April  22nd.  Some few hundred 
students organized a sit-in at the University  of Bucharest  to ask the NSF to 
accept the Timișoara Proclamation (a pro-democratic document). This protest 
was  completely  ignored by the NSF and had no influence  on the  transition 
process (Tismaneanu, 1997).
The first free and open elections took place on May 20 th, as planned, and 
were  won by  Iliescu's  NSF with  85% of  the  votes.  Concerning  contentious 
politics,  Iliescu  made  use  of  the  Jiu  Valley  miners  as  a  demobilizing  force 
against the few remaining student protests on two occasions after the elections. 
These two events closed off any further attempts by anti-NSF forces to push for 
further democratization. The first event was from the 13th to the 15th June, when 
Jiu Valley miners were mobilized in Bucharest by the NSF to demobilize the 
student protests against Iliescu’s government. The second event was held from 
the  24th to  the  28th June  to  coincide  with  the  end  of  the  Petre  Roman 
government,  consolidating  Iliescu’s  hegemony  until  2004  (Verdery  and 
Kligman, 1992: 130-137).
Structural conditions
The Ceaușescu regime is unanimously defined as a personalized dictatorship, 
and  conceptualized  as  –following  Linz  and  Stepan’s  (1996)  categories-  a 
sultanistic,  neo-patrimonial,  totalitarian  neo-Stalinist  regime  (Carey  and 
Eisterhold, 2004, Siani-Davies, 2005: 16, n. 30; Tismaneanu, 1997: 410-411). 
Romania’s  communist  regime  never  underwent  meaningful  de-Stalinization 
after Stalin’s death in 1953. According to Roper, 
There were three reasons why de-Stalinization did not occur: firstly there were 
no  ardent  anti-Stalinists  in  the  leadership  … secondly,  the  party  feared  the 
consequences  of  de-Stalinization  because  the  party’s  support  among  the 
population was so tenuous … Party members feared that the population would 
interpret  de-Stalinization  as  de-communization  …  Thirdly,  de-Stalinization 
propaganda was not successful with the people because of the PMR’s [RCP] 
policies.  Romanian  leaders  anticipated  a  challenge  from Moscow  and  used 
economic incentives to increase their support among the people (2000:30).
Following Roper’s historical narration, the RCP remained nationalist throughout 
its  history.  Romania  was  among  the  few  countries  that  stayed  outside  the 
Warsaw Pact, and foreign policy after Stalin’s death was not close to Moscow’s. 
Rather, Gheorghiu-Dej and later Ceaușescu invested heavily in their relations 
with  China  in  order  to  balance  Russia's  influence.  There  was even  an  anti-
Russian  element  to  their  discourse,  and  they  guarded  their  autonomy  from 
Moscow. Economically, Romania also stayed away from the COMECON. Dej’s 
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efforts to industrialize the country broke the traditional division of labor that 
Moscow wanted to impose on the Eastern bloc, where Romania and Bulgaria 
were to remain de-industrialized and act mainly as the bread baskets of the more 
industrialized nations of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Instead, Dej and 
Ceaușescu maintained close economic ties with the West, mainly through trade. 
As  a  result  of  these  policies,  Romania  experienced  a  huge 
industrialization process during the 1970s, but in the 1980s the socioeconomic 
context  was  depressed  due  to  the  oil  crisis  of  the  1970s  that  had  led  the 
government  to  take  austerity  measures  resulting  in  a  lack  of  products  to 
consume (Kaser, 2010). According to Siani-Davies:
The  spark  of  the  crisis  of  the  early  1980s  largely  came  from  adverse 
developments  in  the  global  economy.  Building  on  Romania’s  traditional 
interests in the oil industry,  a great deal of investment had been poured into 
facilities for the processing of secondary petroleum products as well as other 
energy intensive sectors, such as steel manufacturing and aluminium refining … 
The  Romanians  intended  to  cover  the  cost  of  these  new  investments  by 
exporting the goods produced to the West, but not only was this fateful decision 
made at a time when reliance on oil imports was decreasing because of decline 
in domestic production –this fell by 20 per cent between 1982 and 1988- but 
also the new plant began to come on stream just as the price of oil tripled during 
the second OPEC crisis. This was largely caused by the revolution in Iran, a 
country that had traditionally been an oil  supplier to the Romanians … The 
result was that in 1980 the spectacular growth of the 1970s was brought to a 
shuddering  halt.  Ceaușescu’s  reaction  to  the  crisis  was belated  but,  when it 
came,  it  displayed the  same single-mindedness  which  had earlier  driven his 
quest for industrialization. A massive campaign of export promotion and import 
substitution was launched in which the most marketable products, especially 
foodstuffs,  were shipped abroad,  leaving only ‘patriots’ such as pig’s feet at 
home (2005: 32-33).
In addition, Ceaușescu decided to pay the totality of Romania’s foreign debts, 
drying out the domestic economy for this purpose.  While  the country’s debt 
stood at US$ 11 billion in 1982, by 1986 it had already been cut to US$ 5.5 
billion (Siani-Davies, 2005: 33).
Way (2008), in an article that studies several cases of the collapse and 
survival of autocrats, states that the main explanatory dimension in the removal 
of autocrats is not regional diffusion, nor the opposition’s capacity to mobilize, 
but the links between the authoritarian regime and the west. In his words:
Authoritarian stability is most affected by: 1) the strength of a country’s ties to 
the West; and 2) the strength of the incumbent regime’s autocratic party or state. 
In  a  nutshell,  post-communist  autocrats  have  been more  likely to  hold onto 
power when their countries have weaker ties to the West and when they have 
access to at least one of the following sources of authoritarian organizational 
power:  a  single,  highly  institutionalized  ruling  party;  a  strong  coercive 
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apparatus that has won a major violent conflict; or state discretionary control 
over the economy (Way, 2008: 60).
Following this argument, it may be said that due to the lack of extra-economical 
contacts  with  the  west  among  Romanian  elites,  the  post-communist  Iliescu 
elites were able to control power, blocking the pro-liberal democracy sectors.
Cleavages
There were two main cleavages relevant under the Ceaușescu regime. The first 
was between the political elite (i.e., the RCP leadership) and the workers, and 
the second between the technocracy and the political elite (Datculescu, 1999: 
102-104). According to Datculescu, the first cleavage grew with the economic 
difficulties of the 1980s: “Until the ‘70s, the Communist Party lived up to its 
commitment  made  to  the  workers,  while  the  workers  accepted  the  leading 
position  and  the  self-assumed  objectives  of  the  Party.  The  economic 
deterioration  in  the  ‘80s  led  to  a  crisis  and  a  major  cleavage  between  the 
workers and the communist political elite” (1999: 102). And he continues: “The 
first signs of the incipient cleavage appeared in 1977, when 35,000 miners in 
the Jiu Valley went on a strike that could be stopped only by promises made 
personally by Ceaușescu to the miners and after  the strike leaders  had been 
arrested.  But  the  most  dramatic  illustration  of  the  cleavage  that  separated 
workers  and  the  political  elite  was  the  revolt  of  the  workers  in  Brașov  on 
November 15, 1987” (1999: 103).
The second cleavage,  again according to  Datculescu (1999:  103),  was 
based on the “… policy [of the regime] oriented against the intellectuals” with 
the purpose of delegitimizing their role in society. According to the author:
In his effort  to preserve the loyalty of the working class, Ceaușescu tried to 
glorify manual  work  by granting  it  a  higher  social  importance  than  that  of 
intellectual activity… The anti-intellectual policy materialized in lower pay for 
intellectuals  in  comparison  with  qualified  workers  in  top  industries  and  the 
reduction of their  share in the social  structure.  Between 1961 and 1985, the 
number of high-school graduates decreased by 14 percent, while that of higher 
education  graduates  decreased  by  13  percent.  Meanwhile,  the  number  of 
vocational school graduates increased by 44 percent (Datculescu, 1999: 103),
Since  democratization  several  new  cleavages  have  emerged.  Bakke  (2010) 
points to the emergence of an ethnic Hungarian party in Romania, but in her 
opinion the main cleavage in Romania since the first free and open elections is a 
left-right one, while during the transitional period the most important cleavage 
was between regime change and regime continuity. 
Tismaneanu  (2007:  36)  holds  that  the  shaky  character  of  the  post-
communist  regime  is  explained  by  the  vacuum  left  by  the  “ideological 
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extinction  of  Leninist  formations”.  This  vacuum  was  filled  by  syncretic 
constructs  that  drew on the region’s  pre-communist  and communist  heritage 
(nationalism in both its  civic  and ethnic  incarnations,  liberalism,  democratic 
socialism,  conservatism,  populism,  neo-Leninism,  and  even  more  or  less 
refurbished fascism). Accordingly, the collapse of Leninism opened the door for 
many  ideological  streams,  some  of  which  were  anti-modern,  illiberal  and 
authoritarian in character.
According  to  Whitefield  (2002),  the  emergence  of  socially  based 
cleavages during the post-communist period (age, regions, education, ethnicity 
among Hungarians, and a regional one in Transylvania) may be the result of the 
expression  of  cleavages  that  were  not  previously  officially  recognized.  In 
addition,  regime  change  has  produced  the  emergence  of  new  ideological 
cleavages:  social  and political  liberalism versus  the  recovery  of  the  illiberal 
roots  of  the  previous  regime,  economic  liberalism  versus  a  state-centred 
economy, pro- versus anti-western positions, ethnic pluralism versus monism, 
etc.
International context
At the international level, crucial shifts in geopolitical alliances left Ceaușescu 
isolated in the midst of a deep economic crisis. There were four main changes in 
this respect. The first was a permissive context for regime change due to the 
USSR’s decision not to intervene, a result of Gorbachev’s new foreign policy 
which put an end to the Cold War strategy. However, Gorbachev put no pressure 
on Ceaușescu to quit, and Red Army troops had not set foot in Romania since 
1958.  In  addition,  Romania  was politically  irrelevant  for  the  USSR,  though 
there  had been an improvement  in  diplomatic  relations.  A second important 
change was that the West stopped supporting Romania’s independent strategy 
within the bloc due to the changes in the USSR. In addition, Romania lost its 
status of “most favoured nation”1 for trade with the US in 1988. Finally, there 
were bad diplomatic relations with Hungary due to the ill treatment of ethnic 
Hungarians  in  Romania,  which  led  the  Hungarian  government  to  be  more 
protective  than  usual  of  the  Hungarian  ethnic  minority  in  Transylvania 
following its own regime change (Siani-Davies, 2005: 45-52).
Protests
Democratization began with the jailing of  pastor  Lázló Tőkés.  Prior  to this, 
there  is  almost  no  information  on  resistance  struggles  due  to  the  regime’s 
censorship. The only relevant events are the 1977 miners strike in the Jiu Valley, 
the 1983 miners and metalworkers strike in Cluj, the 1987 workers and students 
1This is a category of trade given by the US Congress to non-Western European nations for 
the promotion of bilateral trade agreements.
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protests  in  Iasi  and  the  anti-austerity  protests  in  Brașov  in  the  same  year 
(Deletant, 2006: 85-90). However, due to high censorship under the Ceaușescu 
regime, there is no information available on these events. According to Siani-
Davies  (2005:35),  the  Brașov  events  were  relevant  for  the  democratization 
struggles initiated by the Hungarian minority because the Hungarian Reformed 
Church and its local networks were behind these first claims against the regime.
Why were the 1980s mostly quiet until the events of 1989? According to 
Siani-Davies  (2005:  36-41)  the  key  here  is  the  change  in  the  international 
context along with a military that was not willing to repress citizen protests. In 
addition, “The homogenized structure of the state, which was characterized by 
an  absence  of  differentials  and  an  ideological  stress  on  egalitarianism  and 
centralized  decision  making,  produced  a  commonality  of  experience,  which 
during the 1980s became a commonality  of  grievance”  (Siani-Davies,  2005: 
42). According to Sampson (1984-6), the crucial moment was the cold winter of 
1984-5 when the regime decided to save fuel and stopped providing heating.
However,  this  common  grievance  was  not  enough  to  produce 
demonstrations.  First,  the  Hungarian  Reformed  Church  provided  the 
organizational structure for the initial protests (Siani-Davies, 2005: 43). Second, 
the tradition of football hooliganism in the region (which generally had political 
connotations  with  chants  against  the  regime)  provided  the  protesters  with  a 
well-known repertoire  of  actions  used  during  the  democratization  struggles. 
Sampson (1984-6) suggests that football clubs were the only institutions with 
any  mobilizing  potential,  and  football  matches  were  often  characterized  by 
violence. Third, the factory was the main organizational environment for the 
creation of common grievances and the organization of mass demonstrations: 
“Thus,  with some irony, it  can be said that  Ceaușescu was toppled by mass 
protests that stemmed from an organizational form, the factory, that communism 
had elevated to be both the actual  and also the mythical  heart  of  the state” 
(Siani-Davies, 2005: 44).
As mentioned, contentious politics arrived in the capital on December 19th 
1989,  and  continued  without  much  violence  until  Ceaușescu  escaped  in  a 
helicopter from the roof of the RCP headquarters (cf. Periodization). The end of 
the Ceaușescu government on December 22nd produced a vacuum of power as a 
result  of  his  personalized  type of  leadership,  and this  led to  a  violent  clash 
between security forces and the armed population resulting in over 1000 deaths 
in around three days (Verdery and Kligman, 1992; Siani-Davies, 2005).
Mobilizations against the neo-communists
Pro-democracy and NSF supporters clashed between January and June 1990. 
The main disputes were over the NSF’s refusal to call elections, finally held in 
May  1990.  Second,  the  NSF’s  decision  to  participate  in  the  elections  was 
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rejected by the rest of the political forces, as Iliescu and most of the NSF leaders 
were neo-communists.
The mobilizations against the NSF were organized by the three traditional 
pre-communism parties and the student movement, and were not repressed by 
the security  forces  (from the end of  January  1990 onwards).  However,  they 
produced clashes with pro-NSF workers, mostly miners from the Jiu Valley (in 
June 1990).  The first  mobilization pushed the NSF to share power until  the 
elections in 1990. The second mobilization failed in its attempt to stop the NSF 
from participating in the elections. Moreover, the NSF won the first free and 
open elections with 66% of the votes. After the miners’ violent demobilization 
of the students of the University of Bucharest, the student movement ended its 
role  in  the  transitional  period (Verdery  and Kligman,  1992:  130-136;  Siani-
Davies, 2005: 247-252; Tismaneanu, 1997: 430-431).
International support
International  support  for  democratization  in  Rumania  was  almost  inexistent. 
This was a result of the lack of an organized civil society in Romania during the 
Ceaușescu regime. According to Chilton (1994: 170), “Romania is the purest 
example of an extremely strong and repressive state apparatus and a very weak 
civil society” (cf. also: Pralong, 2004).
During the resistance period, Romanian dissidents were isolated from the 
main  transnational  coalitions  against  authoritarianism in  the  region.  Prior  to 
1989 there was no Romanian participation in the transnational  human rights 
coalition  in  which  Polish,  Hungarian  and  Czechoslovakian  dissident 
organizations participated. In addition, before 1989, there were no Romanian 
signatories to the Helsinki Memorandum of 1986. The only transnational links 
were  those  between  the  Hungarian  Protestants  and  Hungary,  which allowed 
some human rights protections for this ethnic minority (Chilton, 1994).
Concerning US support, the best analysis of the topic eloquently affirms 
that:  “Prior  to  December  1989,  there  was  almost  no  US  assistance, 
governmental or non-governmental, relating to the promotion of democracy or 
human  rights  in  Romania.  The  complete  absence  of  any  liberalization 
movement in the country meant that Romania, unlike some other countries of 
the  region,  had no human rights  groups,  independent  unions,  environmental 
groups,  or  other  entities  that  Western  organizations  could  support”.  And 
continues:  “US  democracy  assistance  was  limited  to  a  few  small  grants  to 
expatriate  groups,  such as  NED’s support  for  Agora,  a  quarterly  intellectual 
journal  in  Romanian  edited  by  prominent  Romanian  émigrés,  and  for  the 
London-based  Mihai  Eminescu  trust  for  independent  cultural  activities  in 
Romania” (Carothers, 1996: 19).
However,  since Ceaușescu’s fall,  US support emerged and unfolded in 
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three stages that corresponded to the US’s perception of the process: 1. from 
December  1989  to  the  May  1990  elections;  2.  from mid-1990  to  the  1992 
national elections; and 3. from late 1992 to 1996. During the first phase, USAID 
and the National Endowment for Democracy sent funds quickly to support pro-
democratic actors, but no actors received support before 1989. The second stage 
was marked by the NSF’s electoral  triumph, which increased US support  to 
anti-communist  actors.  All  the opposition parties,  the student  movement,  the 
Făția trade union and România Liberă (the largest opposition newspaper) were 
supported by US funds, including support for electoral reforms. Finally, in the 
third  phase,  the  focus  was  put  on  NGO  support,  parliamentarian  capacity-
building and continuity in support for the main actors of the previous phase 
(Carothers, 1996: 19-22).
Finally, there were no private funds for Romanian NGOs, and the main 
non-US support came from the Soros Foundation, but this also emerged after 
the fall of Ceaușescu (Carothers, 1996: 22-24).
Actors in the transition I: the elites
The clashes in Timișoara and later in Bucharest quickly brought about the end 
of  Ceaușescu’s  rule.  The  anti-Ceaușescu  neo-communist  elites  were  quite 
compact  in  their  rejection  of  his  authority.  This  meant  that  once  protests 
emerged there was no elite resistance to the decision to topple and execute the 
dictator.  Since  the  physical  demise  of  Ceaușescu,  differences  among  the 
members of the NSF emerged, but they were not influenced by the violence in 
the streets.  Instead they were based on their perspectives on the process and 
their prior involvement in the communist regime. The three main sectors among 
NSF members were:  1. the old guard, the only RCP members who publicly 
expressed their rejection of Ceaușescu during his regime, and still considered 
the USSR a relevant actor  for  solving the problems of the transition;  2.  the 
highly educated technocrats who had opposed the Stalinization of Romania and 
Ceaușescu  but  were  isolated  during  the  authoritarian  period  and  did  not 
participate in any western-based coalition for democracy; and 3. the sector most 
open to the west,  mainly made up of intellectuals that  were however highly 
divided  among  themselves  (Siani-Davies,  2005:  195-199).  After  internal 
conflicts, the second sector dominated the NSF and Romanian politics for the 
next decade.
The neo-communist elite that took power after the fall of Ceaușescu was 
opposed by the student movement and the few other parties that had begun to 
emerge (cf. next section and the section on the student movement).
The anti-communist elites
One part of the anti-communist elites was formed by the three re-emerged pre-
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communism parties. These three parties had been minor forces during the pre-
communist era, with very little mobilization or electoral power, but allied to the 
student movement. The first of these was the National Peasant Party, a Christian 
Democratic-style  party,  conservative  and peasant-based.  The second was the 
National Liberal Party, a liberal, not anti-RCP, centrist and pragmatic party. The 
third was the Romanian Social Democratic Party, a small and irrelevant party 
both before and after communism (Siani-Davies, 2005: 238-243).
The military and the secret police
The military did not intervene during the struggles against Ceaușescu, but after 
his  regime  collapsed  violence  emerged  between  the  military  (in  support  of 
regime  change),  the  Securitate (secret  police)  and  the  mobilized  population 
(armed  by  the  NSF to  support  regime change)  (Watts,  2004).  However,  the 
military was not particularly repressive of pro-democratic forces, allowing the 
NSF to mobilize miners to demobilize the claims for further democratization 
posed  by  the  student  movements  and  the  opposition  parties  (Siani-Davies, 
2005).
Why did the military not repress civilian protests? According to Siani-
Davies (2005: 36-40) the military were not willing to do so because they were 
not institutionally separated from civilian society, the armed forces being mostly 
staffed  by  conscripts.  In  addition,  the  military  suffered  the  same  economic 
hardships as the rest of the population, with no privileges. Finally, in 1986 there 
was a huge cut in military expenditure which left the military ill-equipped and 
demoralized.
The militia  and the  Securitate (secret  police)  were  under  the personal 
control  of  Ceaușescu,  but  they  had  little  commitment  to  their  leader  and  –
according to  Siani-Davies  (2005)-  might  even have  attempted coups against 
Ceaușescu.  They were not  then loyal  to the dictator  when he started having 
problems controlling social unrest. Additionally, they may have known that the 
government  was  weak,  and  hoped  to  control  business  under  a  capitalist 
economy (as then happened) (Siani-Davies, 2005: 40-41).
The churches
The majoritarian (Romanian Orthodox) Church was co-opted by the regime and 
because of this it was a passive and irrelevant actor during the transition. In 
1984  Greek  Orthodox  Church  properties  were  expropriated  (2500  church 
buildings) and all the assets given to the Romanian Orthodox Church, which 
remained the only legal one and completely subordinated to the RCP (Ramet, 
2004; Deletant,  2006: 82).  After  the fall  of communism the Church became 
more  nationalist  and  started  to  claim  more  independence,  but  it  remained 
compromised under the NSF and close to the state. In addition, although the 
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Greek Church was legalized, its properties were not returned (Stan, 2010: 386-
7).
The intellectuals
According to Tismaneanu (1997: 414, 427), intellectual groups were among the 
few that promoted resistance during the Ceaușescu years (i.e. since 1971, one of 
these  groups  was  the  writers’ union),  and  organized  the  Group  for  Social 
Dialogue during the transition with US support.  In a different  interpretation, 
according  to  Siani-Davies  (2005:  30-31)  the  fact  that  no  intellectuals  were 
active  in  the  resistance  to  the  regime  rendered  them  illegitimate  as  pro-
democracy  leaders,  leaving  Iliescu  and  other  former  anti-Ceaușescu  RCP 
members as the only available leaders for the transition. Thus, there seems to 
have  been  only  small  scale  and  isolated  resistance  (nationally  and 
internationally) to the regime organized by intellectuals, and these groups were 
not linked to the general population.
Actors in the transition II: civil society
The mainstream perspective is that civil society was weak and unorganized with 
no international  contacts  during Ceaușescu’s regime, and that  it  was equally 
irrelevant during the transition period. Although no pro-democracy movement 
emerged, there were important disruptive events that impacted on elite attitudes. 
According to Pralong:
Unlike  in  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic  or  Hungary,  there  was  no  dissident 
movement and no organized civil society to speak of in Romania prior to 1989. 
No independent ‘civil life’ was claimed by the few who dared oppose … society 
was atomized and the people were traumatized.  Terrorized by the prevailing 
surveillance of the secret police, the Romanian people were fearful of getting 
together  and  speaking  up.  With  the  exception  of  a  handful  of  state-run 
associations (Communist Youth, Writers’ Union...) and a state-run labor union 
(2004: 231). 
Thus, Romania had to start from a very weak civil society. As a matter of fact, 
Pralong continues, “Within the democratization literature, the Romanian case 
fits the ideal type of ‘rupture’ rather than that of a pacted transition. Yet the 
rupture itself was ambiguous. It was the incumbent ‘soft-liners’ who came to 
power, not the opposition” (Pralong, 2000: 231).
Labour movement
Within this context of a weak civil society, trade unions were the only actors to 
protest  during  the  Ceaușescu  era,  as  already  noted  in  previous  sections. 
However, there is no information about waves of strikes or similar larger labour 
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movement  actions  except  for  those  already  mentioned  in  Brașov  (cf.  Siani-
Davies, 2005, the only author emphasizing these events as relevant).
Concerning the organizational dimension of the labour movement, during 
the Ceaușescu era there was only one attempt to create independent unions. This 
occurred  in  1979 with  the  foundation  of  the  Free  Trade  Union of  Working 
People of Romania by workers and intellectuals in Drobeta-Turnu Severin and 
Bucharest, but it was quickly repressed by the regime (Siani-Davies, 2005: 35).
The  labour  movement  was  not  relevant  during  the  democratization 
struggles.  On  the  contrary,  it  played  a  role  in  the  demobilization  of  pro-
democracy struggles.  Following the consolidation of Iliescu’s power, parts of 
the labour movement were used for demobilization purposes. In particular, the 
Jiu Valley miners were, as mentioned, used for demobilizing protests against the 
NSF twice in June 1990, on the 13th-15th and the 24th-28th (Siani-Davies, 2005; 
Verdery and Kligman, 1992).
However,  since  the  opening  of  the  regime,  the  labour  movement  has 
become more important and experienced a swift process of pluralisation: “As of 
1997, Romanian commentators estimated that there were over 14,000 enterprise 
trade union organizations, 150 federations and 18 confederations in the country” 
(Bush, 2004: 422). Unlike other civil society actors, labor unionism has been an 
active sector in the post-communist period. According to Bush:
The  absence  of  a  dissident  tradition  was  no  impediment  to  the  rapid 
development of trade unions when Ceausescu’s iron hand was removed whether 
founding new organizations or attempting to restructure the institutions of the 
old regime … while the street fighting raged outside their Bucharest office, he 
[Ceausescu]  and fellow UGSR [General  Union of  Romanian  Trade  Unions] 
apparatchiks formed [the National Provisional Committee of Organization] … 
this provisional committee had the blessings of the self-appointed leaders of the 
National Salvation Front, who had seized power following Ceausescu’s flight. 
…The committee’s leaders treated the vast assets of the UGSR as theirs. They 
threw their support behind the National Salvation Front’s program and offered 
money and vacation facilities for victims of the former regime and the recent 
fighting (2004: 420).
The problem for Romanian workers’ organizations became fragmentation: 
Rival  trade  union leaders  and many international  observers  insisted  that  the 
CNSLR [National Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Romania] was simply 
a neo-communist successor of UGSR. The CNSLR did build directly on the 
organizational base of the Communist trade unions and its original leaders came 
from them. Nevertheless, a democratizing process of renewal took place within 
its constituent trade unions following the June 1990 congress (Bush, 2004: 421).
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Religious movement
While the Romanian Orthodox Church was co-opted, the Hungarian Reformed 
Church in Timișoara (Transylvania) was more complex. Although its elites were 
supportive of the regime, there was some degree of autonomy provided by the 
nexus between Hungarians in Romania and in Hungary at the grassroots level 
(Siani-Davies, 2005).
Student movement
The student movement began to be mobilize during the vacuum of power, and 
became the main mobilized actor against the (successful) attempts of the post-
communist  NSF  to  take  power.  The  movement  was  Bucharest-focused,  and 
organized in two main social  movement  organizations,  the Students’ League 
(radical sector)  and the Students’ Union (Siani-Davies,  2005: 233). The first 
relevant protests by students were organized on January 29th and February 9th 
1990  and  called  for  the  democratization  of  the  mass  media,  and  mainly 
television (Siani-Davies, 2005: 234-235). The most relevant protest event was 
the occupation of the square in front of the NSF headquarters to claim for elite 
renewal, pushing the NSF to renounce participation in the first free and open 
elections.  Even though Iliescu received them and discussed their claims,  the 
NSF finally decided to participate in elections (Siani-Davies, 2005: 244-246). 
This protest was one of the main events of the cycle of mobilizations against the 
neo-communist elites.
Demobilization
After the transition, Romanian society (as part of an overall trend in central and 
south  Eastern  Europe)  demobilized  during  the  1990s.  There  are  three  main 
explanations for this, which Bernhagen and Marsh synthesize as follows: first, 
“According to Lewis, the impact of economic-structural change on civil society 
has led to the dissolution of institutions and the disengagement of people from 
political activity, as individuals reviewed their material situation and reassessed 
their  personal  priorities” (2007:50).  In this  regard,  Lewis (1997) argues that 
some kind of  individualization  or  atomization occurred  in  these  societies  as 
economic privatization took place. The same point of view is expressed by Rose 
(1995)  who  notes  that  part  of  the  legacy  of  the  artiﬁcially  high  voter 
mobilization in  the Stalinist  systems is  that  in  post-communist  societies  “… 
‘people  now  appreciate  the  freedom  not  to  participate  in  party  politics’. 
However, we might conversely expect increased incentives to participate now 
that  elections  are  genuinely  competitive  and  democratic”  (Bernhagen  and 
Marsh,  2007: 50). Finally, after analyzing data on elections, the authors argue 
that the legacy of the previous regime is the most relevant explanatory variable, 
and that in the case of Romania the worst combination of factors for promoting 
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active and mobilized civil society was present.
Conclusion
The  Romanian  transition  to  democracy  seems  to  be  a  case  of  unintended 
revolution. In this sense, Carey and Eisterhold give the most accurate synthetic 
definition  that  combines  all  the  existing  interpretations  (presented  in  the 
introduction): “we can refer to the events of December 1989 as an unintended 
revolution  in  effects,  which  began  as  a  palace  coup  in  response  to  a  civil 
uprising, which resulted in violence around the country for a few more days” 
(2004: 3). In other words, there seems to have been an attempted coup d’état in 
Romania, one that was successful thanks to the unplanned process of escalating 
violence organized from below without any link to the intra-elite disputes. This 
process started locally in a community better linked with the outside world and 
with a few supportive networks. Contention quickly scaled up to the capital city 
and produced a vacuum of power as a result of the anti-Ceaușescu communists’ 
decision to immediately topple and execute the dictator. This opened a chaotic 
moment of violence that was not organized by supporters or opponents of the 
regime,  but  was  rather  produced  by  the  vacuum  of  power  in  a  collapsed 
sultanistic  totalitarian  regime.  The  lack  of  international  support  for 
democratization, weak local civil society and unorganized violence allowed the 
neo-communists to settle in power. However, a revolution was already ongoing, 
notwithstanding  the  desires  of  the  neo-communist  elites  merely  to  slightly 
modify the previous regime. This led to the emergence of a democratic setting.
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